En Banc Court Finds Block Licensing Of Essential and Non-Essential Patents Does No Provide Patent Misuse Defense In Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 18101 (Fed. Cir. August 30, 2010) (en banc), Sony and Philips own patents related to CD-R/RW technology as defined in a standard, the Orange Book standard. In arriving at this standard, there were competing methods of encoding position information on the disc: The Philips approach, which is outlined in the “Raaymakers patents,” and the Sony approach, which is outlined in the “Lagadec patent.” Eventually, both Sony and Philips decided on using the Philips approach for the Orange Book standard since the Sony approach was difficult to implement and prone to error. In order to provide a convenient mechanism for licensing the necessary patents to conform to the Orange Book standard, Philips managed block license packages. The block license packages included both the Raaymakers patents and the Lagadec patent.
In American Needle Inc., v. National Football League et al., 2010 U.S. LEXIS 4166, 94 U.S.P.Q.2D 1673 (2010), the appellee American Needle Inc. (Needle) sued defendants including the National Football League (NFL), the NFLP, and Reebok for violations of §1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Between 1963 and 2000, the NFLP granted nonexclusive licenses to various vendors including Needle. In 2000, the teams authorized the NFLP to grant exclusive licenses. The NFLP granted a 10 year exclusive license to Reebok, and declined to renew Needle’s nonexclusive license. The district court and the court of appeals believed the main issue in the case was “whether with regard to the facet of their operations respecting exploitation of intellectual property rights, the NFL and its 32 teams are, in the jargon of antitrust law, acting as a single entity.” American Needle Inc. v. New Orleans LA. Saints, 496 F. Supp. 2d 941, 943 (2007). Both the district court and the court of
By James G. McEwen Introduction On December 5, 2008, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) conducted its first of multiple hearings to explore the continuing evolution of intellectual property marketplace and the effect of this marketplace on competition. Entitled The Evolving IP Marketplace, the hearings are a continuation of the FTC work first published in To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent Law and Policy A Report by the Federal Trade Commission (October 2003) (hereinafter the “2003 FTC Report”), and to revise its findings in light of changes in law since 2003. Of special interest, according to William Kovacic, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, is to ensure that the FTC is able to obtain empirical solutions to IP marketplace issues as they affect competition law, and to determine the extent to which the theory meets practice in regards to optimizing the interface between IP and competition law. As such, the December 5, 2008 hearing is only one of multiple
In Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir 2008), Rambus appealed the finding of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) that Rambus engaged in an unfair method of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices prohibited by § 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a). Specifically, the FTC had found that Rambus had engaged in unfair competition by deceptively failing to disclose its patents and patent applications relating to standards being set by a standard setting organization (SSO) in relation to synchronous dynamic random access memory (SDRAM): the Joint Electron Device Engineering Council (JEDEC). Rambus had participated in the JEDEC in developing the standard, but had withdrawn prior to finalization of the standard. The rules of the JEDEC required participating members to disclose intellectual property encompassing the standards being developed. During this participation, Rambus did not disclose the existence of various patent applications related to the standard under discussion as the claims